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Nowadays, problems of the developing countries belong to the global issues. More and more 
initiatives and financial assistance are to promote their development, but their effectiveness 
is at a low level. Perhaps as a result of it, the role of trade becomes more important and 
international organizations emphasize its role in development. Despite its current relevance, 
there were also attempts on this field in the past, the European Union’s activity is 
outstanding. The EU granted significant trade and other economic preferences for the 
African, Caribbean, Pacific (ACP-) countries on a non-reciprocal basis for a long time in 
the framework of the Lomé Conventions. 
In our study – using multivariate statistical methods – we aim to investigate the 
Conventions’ impact on the economic development of the beneficiary countries. Our before-
after comparison is based on cluster analysis investigating the relative situation of countries 
within and outside of, and before and after the Lomé-system. Our empirical research shows 
that the Lomé Conventions do not have significant impact on the economic development of 
the beneficiary countries. 
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1. Introduction 
Nowadays trade plays an essential role, although some countries are unable to take 
part in the global trade effectively. It is accepted that trade could contribute to the 
eradication of poverty, and several international organizations accept it. They 
represent the interest to enable extremely favourable or free market access to the 
developing, mainly the least developed countries, and this would enable these 
countries to develop. Among these institutions, the European Union has been paying 
also great attention on trade in its development policy, as the EU has been providing 
favourable market access to several developing countries to the European markets. 
The EU differentiates among the developing countries, and it has built up a special 
relationship with the African, Pacific, Caribbean (ACP) countries, and the Lomé 
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Conventions provide the framework of this relationship. 46 ACP countries and 9 EC 
member states signed the first Lomé Convention in 1975, and three other 
Conventions followed this providing free market access and other economic 
preferences for the ACP countries. The objective of the conventions was to promote 
the economic and social development of the contracting developing countries. 
All these mean that there have already been initiatives which tried to integrate 
developing countries into the world trade and promote development through trade. 
Consequently, it is worth analysing how effective they were. Therefore the objective 
of this paper is to investigate whether the Lomé Conventions as a unique initiative 
could contribute to the economic development of the contracting African, Pacific 
and Caribbean (ACP) countries. To achieve this objective, we hammered out a new 
statistical methodology: the empirical analysis is based on a before-after comparison 
using cluster analysis. The analysis does cover not only the ACP countries, but other 
developing countries were also involved into the empirical research, playing as a 
control group. The paper first discusses the EU’s relationship with the developing 
countries, then it introduces the Lomé Conventions as the greatest tool of the EU’s 
development policy. In the next section we detail the methodology of the statistical 
analysis and present the results of the cluster analysis. 
2. The EU’s relationship with the developing countries 
The European Union has been playing a great role in promoting development in the 
less-advanced countries. To achieve this aim, the EU grants not only financial 
assistance, but trade preferences to the developing countries in its development 
policy (Udvari 2008). The EU has established relationship with almost all the 
developing countries, but the preferences it grants for them are different. According 
to the obtained trade preferences we can analyse the relationship and the EU’s 
influence on the developing countries (Figure 1). 
The pyramid of beneficiaries shows that the ACP countries are staying at the 
top level, since they receive the greatest preferences and the most support from the 
European Union (Balázs 2002, Persson-Wilhelmsson 2006), that is these countries 
are the main beneficiaries of the EU’s development policy. The EU-ACP 
relationship is based on contracts which ensure high level of security for the 
contracting parties. Besides, the contracts have a multilateral form as they are not 
signed with only one country but with several ones (with a country group). The 
preferences granted by the contracts cover a wide range of products, and there are 
only few restrictions and exemptions (Persson-Wilhelmsson 2006). Nowadays, 79 
countries belong to the ACP-group (EC 2009a), out of which 48 stays in Africa. The 
framework of the EU-ACP relationship is based on the Lomé Conventions, which 
provided different preferences for the ACP countries. As the Lomé Conventions are 
the key point of our analysis, we detail them in the next section. 




Figure 1 Pyramid of beneficiaries in the aspect of trade preferences 
 
Source: own construction based on Persson-Wilhelmsson (2006) 
 
At the second level of the pyramid the Mediterranean countries are staying – 
they receive similar preferences to the ACP countries, although the contracts are 
bilateral and there are more exemptions and several restricting rules than in the case 
of the ACP countries (Persson-Wilhelmsson 2006). Among the Mediterranean 
countries we can mention 16 countries with which the EU re-launched the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership in 2008 (EC 2009b). 
At the lowest level of the pyramid those countries are standing which obtain 
only preferences under the GSP2-rules. Although this system is the oldest tool in the 
EU’s trade preferences, the GSP-system provides the less favourable preferences 
and the EU grants them in an autonomous way: there are several restrictions, the 
rules on country of origin are extremely strict, besides, and here are several 
exemptions (Horváth 2005, Persson-Wilhelmsson 2006). Nowadays almost all the 
developing countries enjoy preferences under this system (EC 2009c). 
This pyramid is essential for our analysis, since it gives us the opportunity to 
choose out the potential countries for our analysis. The pyramid shows us that in the 
aspect of trade preferences the EU provides for developing countries the ACP 
countries are the main beneficiaries, but other countries are also in connection with 
the European Union in a closer or a looser way. Consequently, this pyramid gives 
the basis for determining the group of control countries. 
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3. The Lomé Conventions 
As the Lomé Conventions and their interventional areas provide the basic points to 
our empirical research, it is important to know their key elements. As the EU’s 
development activity contains not only financial assistance but trade preferences, we 
accept that the Lomé Conventions belong to the tools of the EU’s development 
policy (Horváth 2005). They granted preferences only to the ACP countries – but the 
preferences contained not only trade preferences, but interventions on other 
economic areas (diversification, investment), too (Babarinde-Faber 2004, 
Bjornskov-Krivonos 2001, Nunn-Price 2004). 
The first convention was signed in 1975 and three other followed it. They 
expired after five years, excluding the fourth one with its 10-years. Consequently, 
between 1975 and 2000 the ACP countries could enjoy great preferences in the 
framework of these agreements.3 The number of the ACP countries changed during 
this time: 46 ACP countries signed the first Lomé Convention, while 68 countries 
the fourth one (Bilal-te Velde 2003, Udvari 2008). All of the conventions involve 
the following areas (Babarinde 1994, Udvari 2008): 
- Trade preferences ensured the ACP-countries free market access to the 
European markets in a non-reciprocal way. 
- Industrial cooperation aimed at the industrial and technical development 
of the beneficiaries and at promoting the technology transfer. 
- Financial cooperation enabled the ACP-countries to partake in financial 
support under the framework of the European Development Fund, European 
Investment Bank and the EU-budget. 
- Foreign direct investment prescribed that no restriction may hinder the 
movement of capital between the contracting parties. 
- Technical cooperation aimed at the diversification and modernization of 
the beneficiaries’ economy. 
All of these areas can be found in every convention, the difference is only the 
growing number of the articles in the conventions. It was supposed that the 
interventions would contribute to the economic and social development of the 
contracting ACP countries. Although most of the relevant literature emphasizes the 
trade preferences in connection with the Conventions, the importance of these 
interventions is larger. 
3.1. The importance of the Lomé Conventions 
These Conventions were unique in the era when they were signed. The concept 
seems to be successful as the number of the ACP countries signed the Conventions 
grew from 46 to 68 (and there was no left). It is unambiguous that the key point of 
the Conventions is the trade preferences and long-term free access to the European 
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market granted in contractual form to the recipient countries (Babarinde-Faber 2004, 
EC 1996). 
The granted trade preferences are important because it covered 90% of the 
ACP export products (Babarinde-Faber 2004, Dezséri 2003). Besides, more than 
half of the ACP countries were contracting parties of the GATT4, which dealt with 
tariff cuts of only industrial products and not of agricultural ones – which meant a 
large disadvantage for the developing countries (Stiglitz 2003). Furthermore, non-
tariff barriers were imposed on goods produced by the ACP countries (Somai 1997), 
so these countries had a non-favourable position in the international trade. 
The literature about the Lomé Conventions emphasizes the trade preferences 
only but we believe they were more than simple trade conventions, since they 
contained elements in connection with industrialization and foreign direct 
investments, as well as elements about financial assistance (Figure 2). All of these 
had the aim of economic diversification and to hinder that the ACP countries be 
independent from one (generally agricultural) export product and be able to decrease 
the risk coming from the fluctuating price of the products they can export. 
 
Figure 2. Scheme of the Lomé Conventions 
 
Source: own construction 
 
All these facts suggest that the intervention of the EU should be favourable 
for achieving real economic development of the beneficiary ACP countries. 
Considering this, we try to analyse the economic effects of these Conventions using 
multivariate statistical methods. We have to emphasize that the interventional areas 
                                                     
4 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, signed in 1947. It is the former institution of the World 
Trade Organization. 













provide the basis for our empirical research, but in our analysis we investigate only 
the economic side, since, on one hand, because of lack data we had to leave out the 
effects of financial support from our analysis; on the other hand, lack data hindered 
us to analyse social indicators and social development. In the next section we detail 
the empirical research we made for analysing the impacts of the Lomé Conventions. 
4. The empirical analysis 
The four Lomé Conventions concentrated on the same areas, consequently most of 
the ACP countries could enjoy trade and other economic preferences for 25 years. 
This enables the empirical analysis of their impacts on the economy of the ACP 
countries. The analysis is based on a before-after comparison to investigate the 
changes happened after the Conventions. To get the most relevant results, control 
countries were involved into the investigation: the ACP-development was compared 
to that of the control states. In this section we first introduce the relevant countries 
and the indicators chosen out for the analysis. Later, we detail the methodology we 
hammered out for the investigation, and at the end the results will be presented. 
4.1. Relevant countries and indicators 
For choosing out the potential countries and indicators, we considered two things: on 
one hand, we concentrated on the interventional areas of the Conventions, on the 
other hand, we paid attention on the indicators in related literature. The literature 
review included not only studies on the empirical analysis of the Lomé Conventions, 
but on the relationship between trade and economic growth (e.g. UNCTAD 2007, 
Yanikkaya 2003) and on competitiveness (e.g. Lengyel 2000, Lukovics 2008), as 
well. In our analysis we studied only the direct economic effects of the Conventions, 
therefore we left out social indicators. Finally, we have determined 14 – exclusively 
economic – indicators to analyse the direct impacts of the Conventions, they are as 
follows: 
1. Trade 
a. EU-share from the country’s export 
b. EU-share from the country’s import 
c. Country’s share from the EU’s extra-export 
d. Country’s share from the EU’s extra-import 
e. Share of export from the GDP 
f.    Share of total trade from the GDP 
2. Industry, economic diversification 
a. Share of agriculture from the GDP 
b. Share of manufacture from the GDP 
c. Share of services from the GDP 
d. Agricultural employed within the population 
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3. Foreign direct investment 
a. Inward FDI per capita 
b. Inward FDI in proportion of the GDP 
4. Economic and income growth 
a. Household consumption expenditure in proportion of the GDP 
b. GDP per capita (in logarithm way) 
 
As for the trade performance, we found that we should analyse the trade from 
two sides: on one hand, we have to investigate whether the EU is an important 
partner for the country (1a and 1b indicators); on the other hand, we have to analyse 
whether the country is important for the EU (1c and 1d indicators) and this could 
show the effects of the Lomé-system. The 1a and 1b indicators showed that the EU 
played great role in the trade activity of the investigated countries5, therefore we 
assumed the interventions of the EU could have a relatively strong impact on these 
economies. 
The data were collected in case of all the indicators for the years of 1970-1975 
and 2000-2005, and to avoid the outlier data we counted averages for these years. 
The data are from the on-line database of the UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics 
(UNCTAD 2009a), UNCTAD FDI (UNCTAD 2009b), and the United Nations 
Statistics Division (UN 2009). To eliminate the different measures of the indicators, 
we used standardized variables. 
For determining the relevant countries to the analysis, the pyramid of the 
beneficiaries provided the basis. Beside the ACP countries, the Mediterranean 
countries and economies under the GSP (as a control group) were involved into the 
investigation. The relevant countries are from the study of Persson-Wilhelmsson 
(2006). Originally, 112 countries were involved into the analysis (as was in the study 
mentioned above), but throughout the investigation process we had to leave some 
countries out of the analysis because of three reasons (so-called country-filter): first, 
countries were left out which were outliers in the aspect of trade (e.g. China and 
India); secondly, we missed countries where data for most of the indicators were not 
available. Consequently, the sample contained 82 countries and the analysis was 
based on 14 indicators. But we had to leave out another two countries (the Bahamas 
and Singapore) as we experienced their distorting effects on the results of the cluster 
analysis. Finally, 80 countries composed the sample of our analysis, out of which 50 
countries belong to the ACP-block, while 30 countries (7 Mediterranean6  and 23 
GSP-countries) belong to the control group. 
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For the analysis we hammered out a new methodology. In our assumption, the Lomé 
Conventions granted remarkable preferences for the ACP countries for long-term, 
therefore some development should be experienced in these countries after the 
Lomé-system expired. To gain the most appropriate result, we involved countries 
outside of the ACP-group to the analysis as a control group. Consequently, we 
compared the results of the ACP-countries and that of the control group. 
Our methodology is based on a before-after comparison. The investigation 
periods are the pre- (1970-75) and the after-period (2000-05) of the Lomé-system. 
Analysing the pre-period gives the opportunity to get a picture of the relative 
situation of the ACP- and the non-ACP countries before the Lomé Conventions 
appeared. Comparing this situation with the after-period, we can state the changes 
and investigate the economic results of the Lomé Conventions. For the comparison 
we used cluster analysis, as the aim of this multivariate statistical technique is to 
organize cases into homogeneous groups along the involved variables, and as a 
result, cases in a cluster are nearer (similar) to each other than to any member in 
other clusters (Sajtos-Mitev 2007, Székelyi-Barna 2005). 
In our analysis the clusters enabled us to investigate the economic changes 
between the two periods. The clusters of the pre-period show the relative situation of 
the involved countries before the EU’s interventions, as countries with similar 
economic results were organized into the same group. Consequently, we could 
determine which countries are more developed than the others and which lag behind 
along the indicators we involved into the analysis. Besides, the clusters of the after-
period show the results of the Lomé-system, and we assumed the Lomé Conventions 
could contribute to the economic development of the beneficiaries; therefore 
changes should happen among the clusters. Consequently, during our analysis, we 
compared two things in connection with the clusters: on one hand, we paid great 
attention on the changing meaning of the clusters between the two periods; on the 
other hand, we analysed the changes of the cluster membership, as well. 
Although the cluster analysis is the core point of our methodology, we tested 
and checked the primary results with several other multivariate statistical methods 
(Figure 3)7. These additional statistical techniques were necessary, since there were 
no references from the earlier studies how many clusters were assumed to gain. 
Therefore to determine the appropriate number of the clusters, we used two methods 
for the grouping and we followed the practice as preparing a hierarchical cluster 
analysis at first and then a non-hierarchical one (Sajtos-Mitev 2007). Consequently, 
the hierarchical cluster analysis (with Ward method) was the starting point to 
determine the potential number of the clusters with analysing the difference between 
the coefficients, as great difference between the coefficients shows that clusters are 
far from each other, therefore it is no worth uniting them (Sajtos-Mitev 2007). 
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The hierarchical cluster analysis showed only uncertain results8, therefore we 
tested the potential cases with K-means clusters (non-hierarchical method). This 
method showed us that two countries (the Bahamas and Singapore) appeared in one 
single cluster during the tests of all the cases, therefore we found they had a 
distorting effect and we should leave these two countries out of the analysis. 
Consequently, the number of the relevant countries decreased to 80. 
 
Figure 3. Steps of the empirical analysis 
 
Source: own construction 
 
By K-means clusters method we could test the potential solutions of the 
cluster numbers we received by the hierarchical analysis. To choose out the most 
appropriate one, the multidimensional scaling (MDS) was taken. MDS is such a 
multivariate statistical technique, which decreases the data and enables the 
geometric representation of cases according to their distances in a decreased 
dimension area (Székelyi-Barna 2005).  In our case, the MDS was prepared for two 
dimensions on all the indicators we involved into the analysis.9 The two axis 
(dimensions) could be named as economic and trade performance. The two-
dimension graphic appearance contributed to analyse the distances between the 
cases (countries) and to decide which cluster-number could give the most 
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9 The value of the S-stress indicator shows whether the MDS is appropriate for the analysis (Kovács-
Petres-Tóth 2006). The value of this indicator was 0.071 (good) for the pre-period, and 0.091 (good) 
for the after period. 
Relevant countries (82) and indicators (14) 







Final results Analysing the clusters 




appropriate solution. Using the coordinates we gained by the MDS, we represented 
the countries in a two-dimension area where we analysed their positions according 
to their cluster membership. We rejected those solutions for the potential number of 
clusters where the countries’ appearance according to their cluster membership was 
not obvious. 
Beside the graphic representation, we used factor (principal component) 
analysis for testing the results of the K-means cluster analysis, as well. Principal 
component analysis is a technique to reduce the number of the variables by getting a 
new variable which cannot be investigated directly (Hajdu 2003, Sajtos-Mitev 
2007). We decreased the number of the variables according to the scheme and 
interventional areas of the Lomé Conventions, and as a result we received six 
factors.10 The cluster analysis was prepared again (beginning with the hierarchical 
method) along these new factors as variables. The result was persuasive: the 
difference between the two cluster analyses was not significant – the most 
appropriate number of clusters was the same, besides, most of the countries 
belonged to the same cluster as originally. As there was no significant difference and 
as there was no contradiction with the testing methods, we could accept the results 
of the K-means cluster analysis. 
4.3. Results of the cluster analysis 
In this chapter we will present only the results of the K-mean cluster analysis for 
both periods. As there was no contradiction between the testing methods, we do not 
detail either the pre-calculations or the results of the testing methods. Because of the 
relatively large number of the countries, we cannot introduce the membership of the 
clusters, we will present only some examples, the final results of both periods can be 
found in the appendix. 
 
4.3.1. Cluster analysis for the pre-period of the Lomé Conventions 
The analysis for the pre-period was prepared along the above-mentioned 14 
indicators and for 80 countries. The MDS and the K-means cluster analysis 
strengthened us (complying with the hierarchical cluster analysis) that the most 
appropriate number for the clusters are four (Figure 4). 
Analysing the final cluster centres and the means of all the clusters, we could 
give meanings for them and make economic distinguish between them. Using cross 
                                                     
10 All the principal components preserved more than 80% of the information of the original indicators. 
These components are as follows: (1) openness, (2) EU’s importance in the country’s trade, (3) 
country’s importance in the EU’s trade, (4) FDI, (5) economic activity outside the industry, (6) 
economic income. 
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tables we could also analyse other features of these clusters with other variables 
which were not directly involved into the analysis. 11  
 
 


























Source: own construction 
 
The cluster names and their features are as follows: 
- Middle opened, averagely developed countries (cluster 1), containing 44 
countries, where we can find African and Latin-American countries, as well (e.g. 
Angola, Bolivia, Egypt, Nicaragua, Uruguay). 
- Relatively developed industrial economies with strong EU-relations 
(cluster 2), containing only 4 countries (Argentina, Brazil, Israel, Nigeria). The 
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strong EU-relations mean that the countries are important partners for the European 
Union, but the EU’s role in the countries’ trade is under the average. 
- Relatively closed and underdeveloped, agricultural countries (cluster 3), 
containing 25 economies, out of which 84% are African countries (e.g. Chad, 
Ghana, Burundi, Uganda). 
- Relatively developed, opened economies independent from the EU (cluster 
4), containing only 7 countries. The openness refers to the openness for both the 
foreign investments and trade. Half of these countries belong to the Caribbean 
countries (e.g. Barbados, Jamaica). 
 
These results show that before the Lomé-system there were two smaller 
groups which were relatively developed than the other countries. Furthermore, these 
relatively developed countries are outside of the ACP-group. It is important to 
emphasize that the relatively underdeveloped, agricultural cluster contains mostly 
African countries. As the African countries are the greatest beneficiaries of the 
Lomé-system, and they obtained more favourable preferences than any other 
countries, we have to pay attention on this cluster while analysing the after-period. 
Consequently, we should experience development and changes in this cluster and in 
its membership. 
 
4.3.2. Cluster analysis for the after-period of the Lomé Conventions 
For the after-period similar analysis was prepared as happened in the case of the pre-
period. Because of the interventional areas of the Lomé Conventions we assumed 
that there would be great changes not only in the number of the clusters, but in their 
meanings, as well. Despite, our analysis gave a surprising result. The K-means 
cluster analysis together with the MDS shows that the four-cluster solution seems to 
be the most appropriate (Figure 5). 
Beside the similar number of clusters, the meaning of the clusters remained 
similar to that of the earlier period. The clusters’ names are as follows and their 
features are analysed by using cross tables: 
- Opened economies with strong EU-relations (cluster 1), containing only 9 
countries. They all are ACP countries and they all signed the first Lomé Convention. 
The EU is an important trading partner for the countries, but it is not true from the 
other point of view. 
- Relatively developed, industrial economies with strong EU-relations 
(cluster 2), containing only four countries, but there is a little change in comparison 
to the earlier period: Brazil and Israel remained in the relatively developed cluster as 
were in the first period, but two new countries joined them (Thailand, Malaysia). 
None of the cluster members signed any of the Lomé Conventions, and three of 
them are under the GSP-system. 
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- Relatively underdeveloped, agricultural economies (cluster 3), containing 
32 countries. 78% of the cluster members signed the first Lomé Convention (1975), 
and most of the cluster members (94%) are ACP countries. Besides, 60% of the 
ACP countries belong to this cluster. 
- Averagely developed economies without any important EU-relations 
(cluster 4), containing 35 countries. 80% of the countries which did not sign any of 
the Conventions became member of this cluster; consequently most of the control 
countries are in this cluster. 
 





























Source: own construction 
 
Although we expected significant changes in the meanings and features of the 
clusters, our results show the opposite. The clusters are similar to the pre-period 
ones in the aspect of their meaning. Looking at the features of the cluster members, 
it is unambiguous that most of the ACP countries could not gain from the 
preferences of the Lomé Conventions, since most of these states belong to the 




Lomé Conventions seem to be unsuccessful in the objective of economic 
development and diversification in the beneficiary countries. The features of the 
clusters’ membership present that countries out of the Lomé-system could perform 
better in the aspect of the investigated variables. It is important to compare the two 
periods’ results, and we can do it as the clusters are extremely similar to each other. 
 
4.3.3. Comparing the two periods 
The results of the two periods are similar to each other: the clusters of the after-
period could be corresponded to those of the pre-period. This provides the basis for 
comparing the two periods. Since the sample of our before-after comparison was 
equal in the two periods (there was no change), that is the data of the two periods 
belong to the same sample, we can control these two related samples’ homogeneity. 
And homogeneity of two related samples can be checked with nonparametric tests 
(Ketskeméty-Izsó 2005, Vargha 2000). Consequently, for comparing the results of 
the two periods in our analysis we used a nonparametric test12 (Wilcoxon Signed 
Ranks Test), with which we investigated two things: 
- whether there is significant difference between the cluster memberships of 
the two periods; 
- whether signing one of the Lomé Conventions contributed to the changes 
of the cluster membership. 
 
In our analysis, the Wilcoxon-test shows that there is no significant difference 
between the cluster memberships of the two periods (p-value: 0.152). This means 
that countries belonging one cluster of the pre-period became members mostly the 
same cluster in the after-period. Besides, as for the effects of the Lomé conventions 
on the cluster membership, the result of the non-parametric test presents that there is 
no importance whether the countries signed the Lomé Conventions or not, the 
contracts do not have determining role in the changes of the cluster membership (p-
value varies between 0.102 and 0.336 along the Lomé Conventions). 
Consequently, the Lomé Conventions – though they seemed to be effective 
intervention by the European Union – seem to perform without any spectacular 
results. Countries which were out of the Lomé system could achieve better results 
and they are more developed than the ACP countries getting significant preferences. 
Our analysis shows that the most unfavourable result occurs in case of the countries, 
which belonged to the underdeveloped, agricultural economies in the pre-period: 
although they became beneficiaries of the Lomé-system, they could not perform 
much better and they remained in the same cluster. The objective of economic 
diversification was not successful, either – as the most underdeveloped cluster 
                                                     
12 At first we had to recode the number of two clusters to correspond to each other in the two periods. 
As a matter of fact, cluster 4 in the after-period corresponds to cluster 1 in the pre-period (the new 
number is 1), while cluster 1 in the after-period to cluster 4 in the pre-period. 
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contains mostly ACP countries. Analysing the cluster membership in the after-
period we could see that there are some success countries – but unfortunately they 
are little and happened to countries mostly which are outside the ACP-group (e.g. 
Thailand, Malaysia). 
5. Conclusions 
The aim of this paper was to study the impacts of the Lomé Conventions on the 
economic development of the ACP countries. This paper and the empirical analysis 
show us that the Lomé Conventions do not have important impact on the economic 
development of the contracting countries. 
The paper introduced that the ACP countries became the greatest beneficiaries 
of the EU’s development policy, the preferences they can enjoy are at the highest 
level. These show that a special relationship exists between the EU and the ACP 
countries. The framework of their relationship is regulated by the Lomé Conventions 
which granted trade and other economic preferences for the contracting ACP-group. 
The preferences were on non-reciprocal basis, meaning the ACP countries could 
enjoy free market access to the European markets without any compensation. As the 
Conventions granted long-term preferences on the same areas (trade, economic 
diversification, foreign direct investments) in contractual form, the basis for an 
empirical analysis is given to investigate their direct impact on the development of 
the beneficiary countries. 
The analysis was based on a before-after comparison: the pre-period of the 
Lomé Conventions was compared to the after-period. Besides, our empirical 
analysis contained countries outside of the ACP-group playing as a control group. 
Consequently, we compared the results of the ACP countries to those of the control 
group, stating the relative situation of the countries within and outside of the Lomé-
system. For the analysis we used multivariate statistical techniques and we 
hammered out a new methodology. The empirical research was based on cluster 
analysis using other multivariate statistical methods for testing the results. 
As 25 years passed between the two periods, changes and some economic 
development were expected. But our analysis does not show significant changes. 
Interestingly, the clusters’ number remained the same with the same meaning in the 
after period as they were in the pre-period. Comparing the memberships of the two 
periods we could state that there is no significant change. Moreover, most of the 
African ACP countries remained members in the least developed cluster. This result 
is more important if we remember that the Lomé Conventions were not only about 
trade preferences, but contained elements in connection with economic 
diversification and foreign investments. 
Consequently, free market access and non-reciprocal trade preferences 




initiative of the international organizations should be complemented with other 
development assistance to achieve more favourable results. 
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Cluster membership in both of the periods 
Country Cluster (pre) Distance (pre) Cluster (after) Distance (after) 
Angola 1 2,453 1 2,329 
Argentina 2 2,522 4 2,171 
Bangladesh 3 1,903 3 2,372 
Barbados 4 2,382 4 2,522 
Belize 4 3,17 4 1,719 
Benin 1 2,388 3 1,674 
Bolivia 1 1,663 4 1,679 
Brazil 2 3,459 2 2,92 
Burkina Faso 3 2,395 3 1,718 
Burundi 3 2,166 3 1,758 
Cameroon 1 2,296 4 1,998 
Cape Verde 1 3,128 4 2,845 
Central African R. 3 2,646 3 3,637 
Chad 3 2,027 1 3,911 
Chile 1 2,938 4 2,547 
Colombia 1 1,925 4 1,178 
Comoros 3 2,273 3 1,714 
Congo 1 3,478 1 2,587 
Costa Rica 1 2,835 4 1,339 
Cote d'Ivoire 1 2,055 4 2,343 
Dem. Rep. Congo 1 2,374 3 2,608 
Ecuador 1 2,166 4 1,351 
Egypt 1 2,289 4 2,481 
El Salvador 1 1,811 4 2,22 
Ethiopia 3 2,109 3 3,128 
Fiji 1 2,243 4 1,93 
Gabon 1 4,736 1 3,306 
Gambia 3 3,099 3 2,421 
Ghana 3 1,453 3 1,649 
Grenada 1 2,753 1 3,976 
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Guatemala 1 2,191 4 1,97 
Guinea-Bissau 3 2,908 3 2,875 
Guyana 1 2,5 1 2,931 
Haiti 3 1,611 3 2,809 
Honduras 1 2,128 4 1,871 
Israel 2 3,66 2 2,962 
Jamaica 4 2,36 4 1,312 
Jordan 1 3,126 4 1,832 
Kenya 3 1,656 3 1,228 
Lao P. D. R. 3 3,004 3 2,241 
Lebanon 1 3,431 4 2,949 
Liberia 4 3,596 3 3,587 
Madagascar 3 1,815 3 1,389 
Malawi 3 2,051 3 1,243 
Malaysia 1 2,441 2 3,134 
Mali 3 2,882 3 1,238 
Mauritania 1 3,407 1 2,886 
Mauritius 1 2,135 4 2,64 
Morocco 1 2,769 4 3,658 
Mozambique 3 2,828 3 1,979 
New Caledonia 1 3,327 4 2,999 
Nicaragua 1 2,473 4 1,811 
Niger 3 1,609 3 1,335 
Nigeria 2 4,233 3 3,255 
Pakistan 3 1,912 4 2,091 
Panama 4 2,106 4 2,524 
Papua New Guinea 1 3,234 3 3,716 
Paraguay 1 1,625 4 1,706 
Peru 1 1,939 4 1,224 
Philippines 1 3,091 4 2,329 
Rwanda 3 1,157 3 1,658 
Samoa 1 2,465 4 2,325 
Sao Tome and P. 1 3,112 3 3,788 
Senegal 1 2,316 3 2,264 
Is Free Market Access Enough for Development? – Lessons of the Lomé Conventions 
 
96 
Seychelles 4 3,172 1 4,451 
Sierra Leone 3 2,46 3 3,994 
Somalia 3 1,631 3 3,319 
Sri Lanka 1 2,429 4 1,73 
Sudan 3 1,773 3 2,226 
Suriname 1 2,829 1 2,711 
Syrian Arab Rep. 1 1,365 4 2,922 
Thailand 1 2,413 2 2,673 
Togo 1 2,881 3 1,71 
Trinidad & Tobago 4 2,523 4 2,767 
Tunisia 1 2,123 4 4,405 
Uganda 3 1,475 3 1,145 
Tanzania 3 1,425 3 1,148 
Uruguay 1 2,511 4 1,228 
Vanuatu 1 2,964 4 2,756 
Zambia 1 3,047 3 1,777 
Source: own calculation 
